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Abstract This article analyzes various roles of develop-
ment practitioners (called outsiders) in five different cases
of community-based development (CBD) in rural Iran. It
provides a review of the literature on CBD and identifies
three main types of roles fulfilled by outsiders to support
indigenous development processes. These include prepar-
ing the ground, activating community-based organizations
as participatory institutions, and taking on the role of
brokers who bridge the gap between the local community
and outside institutions—especially the state and market.
From the analysis of empirical qualitative data collected
during fieldwork in Iran, the article concludes that while
the roles played by the outsiders in CBD interventions
there correspond mostly to those identified in the literature,
there are differences in their strategies of intervention and
activities under each role which correspond with their
contextual contingencies. Recognizing this variation is
needed to deepen the understanding of CBD practices and
help practitioners think about alternative perspectives and
approaches.
Keywords Community-based development (CBD) · Iran ·
Community-based organizations (CBOs) · Local
development · Participation
Introduction
After more than 50 years of state-centered and top-down
development practices in Iran, over the last two decades
several reforms have given rise to community-based
development (CBD) practices, supported by the state, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and foreign donors.
This article focuses on this trend and analyzes the roles
played by these ‘outsiders’ in supporting the establishment
and growth of different types of CBD interventions. By
‘outsiders’ in this article, we mean different actors outside
of the locality. Although the most important outsider in
Iran is the government, other actors like international
organizations (IOs) and businesses may also be considered
as outside intervening actors. The empirical findings of this
study on the role of such outsiders (based on five qualita-
tive case studies) are compared with the roles of outsiders
found in the scholarly literature in order to generate addi-
tional insights about their roles which merit greater atten-
tion by scholars and practitioners.
This section briefly outlines the historical context for our
study. The Land Reform Law enacted in 1962 marked a
turning point for society and politics in the rural commu-
nities of Iran. Following the passage of this legislation,
farmers became the owners of the land and received
financial loans for investment. Besides raising critical
questions about the equitable land distribution and the loss
of economies of scale, some critics argue that by dividing
assets and creating individual properties, the policy
destroyed the social organizing institutions which used to
be an inseparable part of the farmers’ lives, such as systems
of collective agriculture called Boneh and those of coop-
erative production called Vareh (Farhadi, 2008; Hesamian
et al., 2005; Majd, 1987). The roles of landlords as gov-
ernors, organizers, and intermediaries were taken over by
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the state bureaucracy and thus enhanced state power (Ka-
touzian, 1974). Azkia and Ghaffari (2004) identify the
resulting bureaucracy, centralization, and top-down plan-
ning as the most important causes of socio-economic
problems in the rural communities after the Land Reform
Law, and argue that these trends continued after the Islamic
Revolution and even intensified with the extension of the
state bureaucracy.
Following the Islamic Revolution in 1978, and espe-
cially from the beginning of the Sazandegi (Construction)
period in 1989, the government started widespread devel-
opment programs in rural areas, mostly aimed at physical
and infrastructural improvement. Thanks to its oil rev-
enues, the government of Iran was able to spend significant
amounts on the construction of roads and access to elec-
tricity, drinking water, gas, and in recent years the internet,
in even the remote corners of the country.1 Academic
studies have shown that these approaches have led to a
certain passive attitude on the part of the population, with
expectations of free service from the government (a ‘beg-
ging mentality’) and less productive economic behavior
(Anbari, 2016; Rafipoor, 1997). Indeed, the new road
infrastructure facilitated the commute to the cities and the
sales of cheaper consumer products in rural areas, leading
to the adoption of new lifestyles and feelings of relative
deprivation in local communities (see Rafipoor, 1986 as
cited in Rafipoor, 2014). The depletion of water reservoirs
and the destruction of rangeland caused by global climate
change and unsustainable use of natural resources resulted
in increased poverty and unemployment (Jalili Kamju &
Nademi, 2019). As we can see in Table 1, the rural pop-
ulation as a share of total population decreased signifi-
cantly, while the relatively stable household sizes imply
that rural fertility rates did not decrease and rural mortality
rates did not increase significantly. The fact that the share
of the rural population in the total population dropped by
more than half during the period 1976–2016 is thus mainly
due to rural out-migration to the cities—especially metro-
poles—in the hope of finding jobs and a more comfort-
able life. However, in reality many of the migrants ended
up living on the margins of urban society, dealing with
many new life issues and social harms (Amiri et al., 2014).
The majority of migrants are youths in the productive ages
of 25–64, increasing the ‘dependency ratio’ in rural com-
munities (Iran Planning and Budget Organization, 2017).
Given the overall negative track record of rural devel-
opment approaches in Iran, a new wave of national grass-
roots development activities started to take hold since the
early 2000s.2 The organizations promoting such grassroots
development support local self-organizing institutions in
order to empower the community as a whole, by rein-
forcing internal agency, cooperative linkages, and greater
local participation. In the current wave, the public, private,
and NGO sectors are unanimous in stressing the role of
Mardom (people), youth, and local institutions in address-
ing the failures of formal institutions to resolve social
issues like poverty, inequality, and poor health services
(this is evident simply by looking up the word Mardom
‘ ’ in Google Trends in recent years).
However, there is a lack of reliable studies investigating
and evaluating these more recent local development prac-
tices in Iran. While there are many articles on economic,
technical, and industrial development approaches in the
country, there are only a few on community-based and
participatory approaches. Most of these articles have
explored the factors of and barriers to community partici-
pation in rural areas (Aref et al., 2009; Kolahi et al., 2014;
Kamali, 2007; Dadvar-Khani, 2012; Rezvani et al., 2009)
and the functions of community-based organizations
(CBOs) in the development process (Barimani et al., 2016;
Firouzabadi & Jafari, 2016). But there is still a research gap
about Iran—especially in international publications—on
the interventions in the recent wave of Iranian development
programs and the roles outsiders played to address these
barriers to participation and to form the CBOs.
We chose the CBD framework and concept as the strand
of literature which is the most applicable to this new wave
of development in Iran. Although there is a significant body
of literature on CBD and other participatory and bottom-up
approaches, and they are widely used by international
organizations around the world, there are still many open
1 According to the UNDP Human Development Report website
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IRN, Retrieved in August
2020), 100% of the country’s rural population has access to elec-
tricity; the mortality rate attributed to unsafe water, sanitation, and
hygiene services is 1.0 per 100,000 population; and 70% of the
population use the internet, while mobile phone subscription is 100%.
No less than 85.5% of adults are literate and the expected years of
schooling total 14.7, almost equally among women and men.
2 The recent approach can be called the third wave of nationwide
local development in Iran. Before that, the first wave occurred during
the first years of the Islamic Revolution, the imposed Iran-Iraq war,
and volunteer activities in rural areas in the so-called Jahad-e
Sazandegi movement, which was also encouraged by the Islamic
government as a sacred action of helping others and constructing the
country. The second wave occurred in congruence with the global
participatory trend, the environmental movement (as it is called by
Fadaee, 2011). It originated as a political movement started by the
reformists after they had attained the presidency, and mostly by the
country’s educated youth who were seeking new values and more
social freedom and political change (Ibid). As a result, from 1997 to
2005, the number of environmental NGOs increased countrywide
from 20 to 640 (Ibid). Such groups were not limited to environmental
areas, but also worked on other social issues. These NGOs were also
empowered by support from international organizations (such as the
UNDP) which preferred neither direct nor state intervention in the




questions and debates for more study. Mansuri and Rao
(2013) reviewed more than 500 empirical studies of par-
ticipatory development interventions. As they report:
Allocations of many millions of dollars are justified
by little more than slogans, such as ‘empowering the
poor,’ ‘improving accountability,’ ‘building social
capital,’ and ‘improving the demand side of gover-
nance.’ Part of the conceptual challenge lies in
understanding what these notions mean, how they fit
within broader conceptions of development policy,
and how they differ across diverse contexts and over
time. (p.49)
They criticize most of the participatory projects by the
World Bank and other organizations that assume the same
trajectories and outcomes, making ‘the design and even the
language of World Bank project documents often seem to
be cut and pasted from one project to the next’ (p.297).
Such projects ignore the differences that may arise due to
different contexts (history, social structure, geography, and
politics) and the learning-by-doing and long-term nature of
CBD.
Indeed, those authors who have tried to theorize CBD
have mostly focused on similar main principles as absolute
solutions for every time and everywhere—such as com-
munity agency, participation, and social capital (Bhat-
tacharyya, 2004; Frank & Smith, 1999; Mathie &
Cunningham, 2003; McLeroy et al., 2003; Murphy, 2014).
However, these principles and their limitations need to be
defined based on real case studies. For example, the con-
cept of ‘participation’ is still vague, and its boundaries and
scope are not defined accurately in relation to other con-
cepts like democracy, self-sufficiency, and indigeneity. In
addition, many studies, while emphasizing bottom-up and
community-based approaches, reported that social and
political structure and the culture and attitudes of the
community may reproduce inequality and individualism
(Bourdieu, 1984; Harriss, 2002; Mansuri & Rao, 2004),
pointing out conceptual conflicts between the so-called
CBD principles.
In order to contribute toward filling this gap, in this
article, we develop and apply an analytical framework in
order to better understand and compare five different cases
of community-based development in Iran. We ask two
related research questions: First, what are the similar roles
played by outsiders in relatively successful community-
based development in Iran? Second, what are the variations
between cases, and how they can be explained with regard
to the local context and the extent to which outsiders play
these roles?
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The
next section reviews the literature on CBD and roles of
outsiders. Section 3 presents the methodology and case
studies. Sections 4 and 5 then present and discuss the
results for the research questions. Section 6 concludes with
some general observations and suggestions for future
research.
Community-Based Development and the Role
of Outsiders: A Review of the Literature
and Analytical Framework
CBD and CBOs
Community-based and participatory development approa-
ches emerged as a response to the drawbacks of top-down
development interventions pursued by national govern-
ments or international organizations (Mansuri & Rao,
2004). As a response to these challenges, community-based
and -driven approaches were developed which are based on
community collective action and participation as the main
agent of change3 (Bhattacharyya, 2004; Mansuri & Rao,
2004; Mathie & Cunningham, 2003; McLeroy et al., 2003).
They mainly adopt an ‘engaged epistemology’ in which the
3 ‘Community-based development’ (CBD) has been used in a broader
sense in any project in which beneficiaries are actively participating,
and ‘community-driven development’ is more specifically used to
express the fact that the control of authority is given to the local
community (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). We use the term CBD in this
article as it is more common in the literature and projects.
Table 1 Distribution of the
population in cities and villages
in Iran
Year 1976 1986 1996 2006 2016
Total population (million) 33.7 49.4 60 70.5 79.9
Rural population (million) 17.9 22.6 23.2 22.1 20.7
Ratio
(% Rural: total)
53.1 45.7 38.7 31.3 25.9
Rural annual growth rate (%) NA 1.87 -0.6 -0.4 -0.68
Average household size in rural areas 5.2 5.5 5.2 4.4 3.4
Average household size in urban areas 4.9 4 4.6 3.9 3.3
Source: National Population and Housing Census (2006, 2016)
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‘community-based interventions emerge from the reality
that has been, and continues to be, constructed and enacted
by the members of a community’ (Murphy, 2014, p.7).
This participation takes place in institutional entities called
CBOs, which consist of organized community members
who voluntarily lead the process. The CBOs are either
informal or legally registered, and may traditionally exist
in the community or may be created intentionally by the
outsiders (Mansuri & Rao, 2013).
CBOs may play different roles in the development
process depending on their individual theories of change;
however, there are some similar core functions. As Aiken
et al. (2016) find in their study, CBOs contribute to
development processes under six main headings (p.1680):
‘helping to build community identity and cohesion;
enhancing community capacity; enhancing democratic
voice; improving service delivery; developing the mission;
contributing to community sustainability.’ The CBO pro-
vides a vital space for enabling constructive and innovative
interactions among people (this concept is also mentioned
by other authors using terms such as ‘liminal space’
[Watkins & Schulman, 2008] and ‘liquid networks’
[Johnson, 2011]). This space is crucial for encouraging
everyone to express and appreciate different views—re-
flecting on the situation with a broader perspective, and
enabling creativity and innovation. The CBO is the insti-
tution whereby people organize themselves and mobilize
their common resources toward the development goals. In
addition to solving problems, they help to create a ‘new
spirit of solidarity’ among members of the community
(Murphy, 2014), enhancing their self-confidence and
growing their knowledge and skills by letting them try to
learn by doing. Finally, as an institution, the CBO embeds
developmental practices inside the community, making
them more sustainable (Ibid).
Roles of Outsiders in CBD
As described in the introduction, the lack of self-confi-
dence, hope, and shared mentality of passiveness and
neediness—together with the fading of productive social
bonds and local structures—have made the role of the
outsiders in CBD in Iran more prominent, at least at the
starting point of the change process. It is also clear that
certain institutional voids are hard if not impossible to fill
without outside help, e.g., improving state-community
accountability relations, accessing market research and
information, product distribution, micro-financing, and
professional training and education (Jütting, 2003). Also,
community-based development interventions by outsiders
seem promising as they may help overcome the ‘poverty
trap,’ which makes it hard for poor people to change their
situations and make appropriate decisions for their long-
term visions, investments, and education (Mullainathan &
Shafir, 2013). In all these cases, outsiders try to take on the
role of catalysts for removing obstacles and triggering
indigenous actions for CBD. In the community-based
approach, the outsiders only try to find some key leverage
points which enable the internal processes of development
inside the community, avoiding imposing the development
agenda from outside. The concept of intervention is used as
Long and Long (1992) describe it, i.e., as an ‘ongoing,
socially constructed and negotiated process’ (p. 35) that
brings out the obstacles to and triggers of productive
internal mechanisms.
We can classify the main roles mentioned in the CBD
literature for outsiders in three categories. First are the
roles related to preparing the ground and increasing
readiness in the community. This includes reaching a better
understanding of the community’s history, assets, and
social structures and then building the rapport with the
local community needed for future relationships (Israel
et al., 1998; Merzel & D’Afflitti, 2003; Frank & Smith,
1999; Mathie & Cunningham, 2003; McLeroy et al., 2003;
Chambers, 1994, 2004). Then, the intervening actor may
provide the primary accumulation of financial, social, and
knowledge capital crucial for participation and the devel-
opment process (Emery & Flora, 2006; Fifka et al., 2016;
Frank & Smith, 1999; Gandy et al., 2016; Kilpatrick et al.,
2003; Mathie & Cunningham, 2003; Putnam et al., 1993).
The second category comprises the roles related to the
creation and/or reinforcement of CBOs’ capacities that
enable them to take on the responsibility of the process
(Mathie & Cunningham, 2003; Merzel & D’Afflitti, 2003;
Murphy, 2014). These roles are vital, as the rest of the
process takes place inside the CBO with the community’s
participation.
Third are the roles related to making useful linkages
between the CBOs and outside actors. Communications
and networks are crucial not only inside the community,
but also with external actors who own the resources of
power, money, information, and service—sometimes
called bridging social capital (Kilpatrick et al., 2003).
According to Mosse and Lewis (2006) and Mosse (2005),
development represents the result of interactions between
heterogeneous actors undertaken through the institutional
‘translation’ process facilitated by ‘brokers’ who operate at
the interfaces of different world views and knowledge
systems. Indeed, the practitioner can work as an ally, a
representative, a spokesperson, or even a political activist
who advocates for the rights of the local community vis-à-
vis the state (Toomey, 2009) or vis-à-vis private-sector
firms to reconsider their business conduct with respect to
governance, employee treatment, environmental protec-
tion, and community involvement (Fifka et al., 2016). The
outsider(s) may try to enhance the internal and interactive
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capacities of both –the state or local government and the
CBOs—as vital prerequisites for more synergistic rela-
tionships between them (Bergh, 2010), e.g., by facilitating
mutual trust, offering incentives to participate, removing
bureaucratic obstacles in the public sector, managing
conflicts, and coordinating networks and partnerships
(Aldaba, 2002). The outsider can also work as a market
broker who fosters business relationships to help the local
community—in the form of CBOs and cooperatives—to
reach relevant markets (Eftekhari et al., 2007).
Despite the three similar roles of outsiders in CBD
interventions, different activities may be fulfilled under
each role corresponding to different strategies of inter-
vention and ideal-types (Dı́az-Albertini, 1991). They may
differ with regard to their legal organization status, finan-
cial structure, sectoral focus, and the functions they carry
out (Fifka et al., 2016). Some organizations accord sig-
nificant roles to outsiders—such as financing, determina-
tion of methods, prescription of frameworks and goals, and
fostering internal leaders (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). On the
other hand, many outsiders limit themselves to creating
capacities for public participation and supporting the main
agents of development (i.e., local community members) to
identify their own ideas and talents as well as enhancing
their skills and relationships (Frank & Smith, 1999; Mathie
& Cunningham, 2003; Murphy, 2014; Rosato, 2015). In
this study, we try to learn more about these different
intervention strategies and the roles of outsiders.
Methodology and Data
The multiple case study research method was used to
explore the roles of outsiders in community-based devel-
opment practices in Iran. In order to develop the current
research questions and identify the country’s successful
case studies, we interviewed experts and activists who had
written about the history of development programs in Iran
and their consequences, and others who know well the
active groups and NGOs in the recent wave of CBD in the
country (eight interviews in total). Seventeen potential
local development case studies were then reviewed, of
which we selected five as most suitable for this study. This
selection was done by identifying relatively successful
cases of people’s participation in local development
according to two main criteria: first, there had to be at least
one formal or informal CBO as the main agent of change
during the program. Second, this CBO should have been
active for at least three years after (financial) support from
the outsiders ended.
We tried to select diverse cases in terms of intervention
objectives and methods, as each case can represent a wide
range of similar practices in the country. Three
interventions are still ongoing (numbers 1, 2, 3), while in
the other two cases (4 and 5) the intervention ended but the
outsiders maintain informal relationships with the CBOs.
The cases are selected from five different provinces of Iran
but are mostly located in the dry areas of the country’s
eastern half (see Fig. 1).
Table 2 gives an overview of the case studies. In each
case, relevant documents such as annual reports, progress
monitoring reports, and evaluations as well as websites
related to the interventions were reviewed (a full list of
primary data is available from the authors). This was
complemented by 15 in-depth semi-structured interviews
by the first author (excluding the first eight interviewees)
with two key “outsider” practitioners involved in each
intervention, as well as a key member of the CBO. The
interviewed practitioners were selected by their organiza-
tions as very well informed, in each case one of them being
the national manager, and the other one the local practi-
tioner. All the interviews took place between May and
September 2018 in Persian. The interview guide was
developed based on the literature review on community-
based development and the role of outsiders. Using dif-
ferent sources—documents, practitioners, and community
members—enabled us to triangulate the data. Between the
interviews, findings from the preceding one were coded so
that any gaps could be filled or ambiguous information
corroborated in the next one. After coding all 15 interviews
and the relevant documents, some degree of saturation was
achieved—meaning that no new themes (‘sub-roles’ or
‘properties’) were added as a result of the last interviews.
The data were analyzed through the qualitative thematic
analysis method (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This method
enabled us to summarize the whole body of data and
develop our own framework to represent various roles of
the outsiders in one view (second research question). Also,
it complemented the comparative multiple case study
method in finding the similarities and differences among
the studied cases by exploring the themes and codes. Using
this method, all the interviews were transcribed and coded
together in Microsoft Excel with other data extracted from
the relevant documents and websites. The main text, the
primary codes, and the final codes were inserted in the first,
second, and third columns of the Excel datasheet, respec-
tively. Then, overarching themes were extracted from a
related set of final codes—reported as ‘sub-roles.’ After
that, we searched through the codes under each theme to
find its defining ‘properties.’ Also, under each of the
properties the primary codes were compared, showing the
variations (‘ranges’) across case studies and, in the final
step, explaining the consistent properties under the specific
‘intervention strategies.’
In order to validate the findings, we undertook ‘re-
spondent validation’ (Bryman, 2016) by sending a draft
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version of this article, in Persian, to the interviewees
through WhatsApp or email. They were asked for their
feedback in writing or by phone. As a result, seven key
respondents who represent all five cases read the findings
and replied. Their feedback resulted in minor corrections to
the findings.
Due to time and resource constraints, the first author
conducted more interviews with practitioners than with
CBO members. Hence, the latters’ perspective might not be
represented fully in our findings. Moreover, as we only
considered the role of the interviewees in CBD as the
selection criterion, their demographic diversity (age, gen-
der, education level, etc.) were not included in our criteria
nor in the analysis. However, all of them were male, Farsi-
speaking, and Muslim. We were also unable to deploy
more time-intensive anthropological methods such as par-
ticipant observation to study each case in more depth. The
thematic analysis method, although well suited to our aims,
was still highly dependent on our primary framework and
did not allow us to perform deep analytics of the language
used (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Furthermore, the whole
coding process was carried out by the first author alone
Fig. 1 Location of the five case studies (indicated with symbol) Source: Google maps and authors’ construction
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(though supervised by the third author), which may impact
the validity of the findings somewhat. Nevertheless, given
the authors’ intimate knowledge of CBD in Iran due to
their past experience working in the NGO sector, we
believe that the findings are sufficiently grounded in
empirical reality.
Roles and Activities by Outsiders in CBD
Interventions: Findings from the Case Studies
In this section, we will answer the first research question
about the extent to which outsiders play the roles men-
tioned in the literature in successful CBD interventions in
Iran, and give some examples of these roles. Then, we
briefly describe each case study to demonstrate the differ-
ences between their intervention strategies and relate them
to the local context and the extent to which outsiders play
different roles (thereby addressing the second research
question).
Similar Roles
We analyzed the data from the case studies using the the-
matic analysis method and classified them according to the
three main types of role developed in the previous sec-
tion. The results are presented in Table 3. From this table, it
is evident that the main roles in our analytical framework
derived from the literature correspond to the themes
explored in our analysis. As all the cases studied here adopt
a community-based approach, they are very similar
regarding the main roles of the outsiders: they communi-
cate well to return a sense of agency to the community,
provide similar types of primary resources (knowledge and
financial), offer motivations for participation and cooper-
ation, and facilitate relationships with the external
environment.
Under the first role, there was consensus between the
interviewees from different cases about the importance of
building trustful relationships with the local elders and
officials, and communications to change mindsets (about
the opportunities and/or root causes of issues). The
















Cenesta (NGO)/ 1979 Environment and
natural
resources
Since 2007 Cenesta board member [CE1] (51),
Cenesta public relations official
[CE2] (100),




Young Farmers Club (NGO)/ 2000 Social and
cultural
development
Since 2007 Young Farmers Club executive
manager [YC1] (130),
Secretary of the Young Farmers
Club Strategic Council [YC2]
(60),
One community member [C2] (75)
3. Golbaf/
Kerman/9205
Resalat Social Development Network (a
consortium of private companies & NGOs)/
2015
Micro-jobs Since 2015 Resalat Secretariat official [RN1]
(60),
Resalat Kerman Province Secretary
[RN2] (90),
One community member [C3] (80)
4. Lazour/
Tehran/1288
Forests, range, and watershed management
organization (Public sector)
Natural resources From 1997
until 2016














Project manager [AS1] (90),
Local practitioner (employed)
[AS2] (90),
One community member [C5] (90)
a According to the latest National Population and Housing Census (2016)
b In three cases there is no end date because the outsider sees it not as a project, but as a long-term relationship
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outsiders tried to return motivation, hope, and sense of
identity to the local communities in the first place,
preparing them psychologically to take on the development
responsibility. Also, it was necessary to find some financial
solutions to start the required funding to define new pro-
jects and implement actions. Moreover, training in basic
technical skills and consulting on their businesses and
projects formed part of all the studied cases (except one),
and were undertaken by the outsiders at the early stages of
intervention.
After preparing the ground, in all the cases, CBOs were
created or reinforced to take their place at the head of the
development process. The outsiders may have provided
incentives or described the benefits in running the CBOs,
and facilitated the interactions inside them. In most cases,
existing collective activities and social capital had declined
and needed new triggers from the outsiders to build them
up again. In all the cases, the local leaders were recognized
as such (intentionally or unintentionally) and took on
important responsibilities in the process of running the
CBO.
And in their third role, all the outsiders tried to forge
valuable connections between the local community and
outside, especially the market and the state. The outsiders,
as development brokers, own political, business, legal, and
media knowledge and linkages that facilitated the imple-
mentation of decisions made by the CBOs.
Different Intervention Strategies and Activities
Despite all the general similarities between the five studied
CBD cases, our thematic analysis also identified consid-
erable differences. Significantly different activities in each
case are demonstrated in Table 4 under each sub-role. In
order to enable a better understanding of the cases, we add
here a short description of each.
The Abolhassani Tribal Confederacy is a small com-
munity of 12 tribes in an area remote from the capital of its
province that has successfully retained its tribal and
nomadic structure and traditional livelihoods based on
animal husbandry. There is a traditional natural resource
management (NRM) system in the area, which is governed
by the Council of Elders. For example, they decide on the
size of the herds and when and where they should be
brought for pasture. An NGO called Cenesta (as the out-
sider) has helped to legally register this traditional Council
as the Council of Sustainable Livelihood (Sabetian, 2015)
in which the board members include the tribe elders -who
are traditionally all male- and the general assembly consists
of the male and female elders of all subsidiary tribes. The
intervention strategy is thus based on the belief that
reviving local knowledge and NRM systems, and recog-
nizing and formalizing them, is sufficient to lead to positive
change rather than technical training and consultation from
outside. For example, the external practitioners helped the
locally created initiatives for resisting drought and for
adaptive agriculture to be documented and presented in
international conferences and exhibitions, which achieved
some awards and grants for the village. Given the strong
collective ethos in the community, the award money is
always placed in a common fund—as happened with the
prize received from the Paul K. Feyerabend Foundation in
2014 and the grant from UN GEF (Global Environment
Facility) Small Grants Programme in 2010. Some other
examples of the rich local heritage in Abolhassani include
the traditional tribal organizing system, the local irrigation
systems, technologies for storing water, the knowledge to
deal with drought through suitable cropping patterns, local
planning for the sustainable pasture of animals, and
indigenous rangeland conservation.
Also, the practitioners facilitated the creation of asso-
ciations for the local tribes (e.g., the Union of Indigenous
Table 3 Similar issues of development, roles of outsiders, and intervention sub-roles in case studies
The main issues of development Main roles Intervention sub-roles
Lack of self-confidence and
hopelessness
Lack of minimum stock of capital to
start the process
Preparing the ground and increasing readiness Building trust and primary communications
Providing or creating financial solutions
Technical training and consultation
Degraded institutions of cooperation Creation and/or reinforcement of CBOs Providing incentives for the local community to
establish CBOs
Facilitation inside the CBOs, with a focus on internal
leaders
Lack of access to outside institutions Making useful linkages between the CBOs
and outside actors
Improving relations with the state and international
organizations (IOs)




Nomadic Tribes of Iran—UNINOMAD) and held work-
shops allowing the elders of the tribes to discuss their
issues and let their voices be heard in public meetings with
different stakeholders from the government. The outsider
thus made no effort to impose any organizational structure,
knowledge, or technology on the community.
This case is also a good example of relying on existing
leaders and social structures in forming the CBO and
facilitating its work in a well-functioning community. Such
arrangements ‘challenge many Western and donor notions
of “good governance” and the predominantly negative
view of “elite capture”’ (Bergh, 2004, p.785). As one of the
local members of Abolhassani (C1) tribe told us,
Leadership of the tribe and solving the problems and
issues have been the task of our ancestors for 300
years and they led well … and during all this period
and before that … we are proud that when any con-
flicts occur inside the tribe, we do not refer them to
the police or the court, but they come to our house
and my father who is the tribe elder ... to resolve it …
and this is not only in our tribe ….
Also, he told us about the reason he put the total amount
of the prize in the common fund:
[The works and benefits] definitely can’t be non-
collective [and captured by only one individual] … if
I want all the benefits for myself … I can get rich
very soon. But our ancestors never did so and wanted
everyone to grow with each other. We are always
happy and live comfortabl[y] and in welfare only if
the whole tribe is healthy and in welfare. If there is a
Table 4 Different activities under roles and sub-roles of outsiders in each case study
Main roles Preparing the ground and increasing readiness Creation and/or reinforcement
of CBOs
Making useful linkages







































































































































































aTranslated as ‘benevolent lending,’ this is a form of interest-free loan (fungible, marketable wealth) that is extended by a lender to a borrower on
the basis of benevolence (ihsan). (Wikipedia).
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benefit, it reaches everyone … It is true that some
activities can be done better individually … but when
the benefits are for all it is better. When the Abol-
hassani involves 300 households [it] is a better place
to live than only with my own family.
In Basfar, the outsider was a national NGO called the
Young Farmers Club. The intervention strategy pursued by
the outsider was to convince the local youths to establish a
CBO for their village in order to reflect on the current status
in their region, the underlying reasons for it, and how they
can change it. The primary core membership of the CBO
were young men which was then extended to a more diverse
population in age and gender (now about 100 out of 150
members are female). The external practitioners made them
more aware of their lawful rights to establish a legal CBO
(registered as an NGO)—in the name of the Young Farmers
Club—which could enter into collaborations with public-
sector organizations. They guided them about what oppor-
tunities exist in public organizations to absorb funds and
services (such as job training and marketing) and how they
can advocate for their rights effectively, and helped them to
create a network and find the right contact points inside the
state bureaucracy. The practitioners did not bring anymoney
to the Club, but helped its members identify and access rel-
evant governmental resources. Strong relationships were
established in the local community with the local govern-
ment and with other villages that have such clubs, to allow
them to pursue their demands in a broader coalition.
The Club undertook a comprehensive assessment of the
history, issues, resources, and available opportunities in the
village. The NGO did not direct the Club members toward
certain issues or solutions, but shared with them its own past
experiences from other rural clubs and different agricultural
methods. The members established various working groups
inside the Club, focusing on culture, sports, and
entrepreneurship, and engaged new members of the commu-
nity in each area.
In Golbaf, a consortium of NGOs and private companies
called Resalat Social Development Network (as the out-
sider) is collaborating to provide strong platforms for
value-chain management for the micro-production (mainly
clothing, meat, and dairy products) undertaken by local
households. The consortium started the collective work in
the region by establishing a CBO called the Social Coop-
erative Club4 with the help of community headmen, which
made financial cooperation possible. The platforms cover
all the requirements including raw material supply, banking
and financing, distribution to retailers or online sales, and
on-the-job training for local people. Some talented local
individuals were identified who took on total responsibility
to recommend and teach others how to use the platforms.
The outsiders only connect with the community through
these local leaders.
We try to take on the local social activists as facili-
tators. … the key for success in Golbaf was finding
that person there … God has placed these people
everywhere; some compassionate, faithful, commit-
ted, concerned, disciplined persons and who have a
business sense … The officials knew him well and
introduced him … they told us: ‘Aha … that person is
exactly the one you are looking for!’ (RN2,
Interview)
As part of the intervention model, all of the production
activities happen in another special form of club called the
Work and Life Clubs—each one specializing in one area of
production. The whole structure (including the CBOs and
the outside actors) is designed so that it has become self-
sufficient and covers its expenses now after several years—
using the concept of social entrepreneurship. In other
words, the households sell their own goods in the online
marketplace and pay the outside providers for the over-
heads and services.
Regarding the gender diversity in this case, the Clubs
contain an almost equal share of men and women—e.g., in
the cloth-making Club, women are in the majority and in
the Club working with animal husbandry, all are men. The
two local leaders in this case are both male, however, the
interviewees claimed that the leaders are always identified
by the local community and in many of their interventions
in other areas they are female.
This case represents a systematic solution to the insti-
tutional void in many rural areas in Iran. The outsiders
believe that in a limited-timeframe project, merely psy-
chological empowerment and the creation of CBOs are not
enough for local development interventions, and that there
is a need to retain connections with outside value-chains.
This intervention strategy is illustrated by the following
quote:
If you look at many empowerment cases in Iran, they
only produce jams, dolls, and at most some different
agricultural crops which mostly fail to sell due to
market fluctuations … But we are providing a value
chain … and if we go away someday, at least the
villager has work skills, has production technology
which is her own … and it does not mean that she is
dependent on us, and we have been cautious about
not making this person our worker. She buys the raw
material and sells the products and so on and we only
provide the infrastructure for that. (RN1, Interview)
4 This club, in the Resalat model of intervention, is a group of local
people who come together in order to help each other—especially by
lending money or pooling their financial resources.
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In Lazour, the development project was run by the local
government organizations (specifically the county branch of
the Forests, Range and Watershed Management Organiza-
tion) with support from the UNDP (United Nations Devel-
opment Programme) and the national state. The intervention
strategy by the outsider, as part of the local government, was
to make participation possible for everyone including the
local community and local government members. A couple
of strong and democratic participative structures were
formed by the local community—and with the outsider’s
facilitation—including the Coordination Council, which is a
body consisting of about 86 members—of which about 15
were female- elected by the whole community to decide on
local issues and their solutions. They were encouraged to
speak about anything that they thought was their issue using
the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) methods and tech-
niques (Chambers, 1994).
Describing our aims and goals honestly is the key to
entering the village. In Iran we cannot wander in[to]
the village at first; they would ask, ‘who is he?’ And
they get skeptical of you and maybe they fear you. So
it is better that you introduce yourself and your goals
to get them to trust you and explain your benefits for
them. By benefits, I do not mean constructing dams,
qanats,5 or giving loans, etc. … I did not say I have
money and facilities. I only said I can help you
organize your minds and develop action plans with
each other. If you do not want that, I will go away! …
Then we start with facilitation methods to get them
speaking and ask them good questions … Building
trust is not a technique but a behavioral relation. …
you only have to be patient. (FO1, Interview)
Council members then came up with some important
projects and organized the local workers to implement
them. These projects included constructing a detention dam
for preventing floods and using water more effectively,
building storage for animal fodder, canal linings, and
planting trees to protect the land. A CBO called the Central
Core, consisting of seven members—including two
females- is responsible for the practicalities of the projects
such as analyzing the problems, writing proposals, and
following up on the decisions of the Council in terms of
implementation. In most cases, the Central Core even
carried out the technical and constructional designs of the
projects, although recently the official Rural Council6 has
mostly taken on these tasks and the Core is not working
anymore. There are also some Workgroups, consisting of
key local stakeholders, focusing on important subjects in
particular areas, like agriculture and animal husbandry. The
outsiders coordinated the public organizations to support
these projects, including budget and on-demand technical
advice and training for their design and constructions.
And finally, in Mohammadabad Paskouh, the interven-
tion strategy was to establish two micro-funds -one for men
and the other for women- pooled by local community
members and outsiders, and to provide low-cost and group-
credit loans to improve household livelihoods. The outsider
is Abrar Charity Society, a national NGO established and
funded by the Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries,
Mines and Agriculture (ICCIMA), which works as an
intermediary between governmental organizations and the
local communities to make sure the money is spent on its
intended objectives. For this purpose, in Mohammadabad,
a CBO called Planning and Supervision Headquarters was
established, consisting of the main male actors from the
local community, to decide who is eligible for the gov-
ernment’s entrepreneurial loans. Moreover, there are some
associations for special products like carpet weaving and
clothing which were empowered by training courses for
women held by the outsider. Abrar supported the associa-
tions with technical training and product marketing.
Besides the entrepreneurial loans, some cost-sharing
infrastructural projects were also accomplished—such as
planting trees throughout the residential areas, replacing
the traditional fuels (bush and wood) that destroyed the
rangelands with fossil fuels, and establishing a garbage
collection system. Most of these projects were decided
upon in the General Assembly of the village, which tra-
ditionally came together at the local mosque.
Having briefly presented the five case studies and the
role of outsiders in them, the following section discusses
and explains the similarities and differences between them.
Discussion
In order to explain the roles of outsiders in CBD inter-
ventions in the five case studies, we have to take both the
similarities shown in Table 3 and different activities in
Table 4 into account. In congruence with our literature
review, we consider the three similar roles as the core of
the CBD interventions and attribute different activities
under each role to various strategies of intervention under
CBD. Therefore, we summarize these roles and activities
as demonstrated in Fig. 2 and discuss them here.
5 A qanāt, or kārīz, is a gently sloping underground channel to
transport water from an aquifer or water well to the surface for
irrigation and drinking (Wikipedia).
6 Rural councils are democratic structures inside the villages of Iran
as part of the local government structures. However, they are often
not very active in terms of promoting local development.
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Preparing the Ground and Increasing Readiness
to Start the Process
Our analysis shows that the more self-identity, agency, and
self-confidence are weakened in the community as a result
of past top-down development programs, out-migration of
the productive human capital, and the dissipation of local
knowledge, the more necessary it is to initially arrange
triggering activities. Our findings show that these issues are
prominent in many of the local areas in Iran. This role in
general consists of communication and dialogue with local
community members in order to empower them psycho-
logically and enhance their mental readiness for the pro-
cess. We see this, for example, in Golbaf, among the
studied cases in which rapid urbanization and several failed
projects had taken place in the past and the outsider took
great pains to rebuild trust and confidence among the
members that development was possible by internal
agency. These dialogues bore fruit in all cases—initially
through the outsiders and the community headmen, and
then with the public, the elders, or the youth depending on
the CBO structure and community leaders (more discussion
follows in our account of the second role).
Furthermore, the outsiders took action to accumulate
internal financial capital, externally donated capital, and/or
state budgets in order to invest in primary projects or
lending to community members to form their own busi-
nesses. In addition, in some cases technical skills and
knowledge as a requirement for development were pro-
vided on-demand or as a condition of receiving further
services from outside (more discussion on the financial
support and knowledge training follow can be found
below).
Primary Organizing for Development Based
on the Community (CBOs)
In all of our cases, the CBOs were similarly at the center of
the development process enabling community members to
participate and mobilize their capital. However, they
Fig. 2 CBD context, intervention strategies, and roles of outsiders. Source: Authors’ construction
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differed regarding their structures. In the case of Abol-
hassani, the development process was built on the com-
munity’s strong traditional social systems and know-how,
and the existing norms of cooperation and collaboration,
without the need to create a new CBO structure. Here, the
role of the outsider lay in documenting the indigenous
heritage, especially the local knowledge and social sys-
tems, and in making them recognized and appreciated by
officials and international development organizations. The
outsider recognized the social structure and internal lead-
ers, and identified them to the relevant national and inter-
national organizations in order to gain legal and financial
support. Indeed, our data show that the ‘modern’ organi-
zational governance functions that the outsider had tried to
impose on the CBO—such as political bargaining and
democratic decision-making in annual general meetings—
had proved significantly less durable than the community’s
traditionally known social practices.
Conversely, in cases where social bonds had weakened
or serious conflicts arisen over time, the outsiders tried to
establish new structures. This made it possible to consider
the interests and benefits of all community member groups
in decision-making. For example, in Golbaf and Basfar, the
outsiders had proposed a specific pre-determined structure
for the CBOs, as a first best solution to establish an orga-
nization. Further, in the case of Lazour, with its multiple
detached clans, the outsider encouraged the community to
create democratic structures and engage in inclusive dis-
cussions, which resulted in participative agenda-setting and
the definition of public projects.
Regardless of any potential CBO structure, local leaders
play an eminent role in Iranian culture. Hence, they were
actively present in all of our cases. In Abolhassani, the
leaders were simply found at the head of the tribal hier-
archy and they were already organizing the CBO. Also, it is
important that these leaders have the ability to mobilize
and encourage most members of the community and to be
passionate enough about their hometown development. For
example, in the case of Basfar, although the intervention
strategy was well realized and the youth were successfully
empowered and mobilized, because the CBO did not
engage with the key influencing members of the commu-
nity, the traditional community would not follow the young
members of the CBO in initiating change in the area.
Finding these talented individuals and assigning them as
local practitioners may also have important implications
for the sustainability of CBD practices. The outsiders who
deal with limitations in their capital and timeframe inevi-
tably cannot stay forever and take care of the CBOs. This
often results in less-frequent meetings and activities inside
the CBOs. In two of our cases (Lazour and Mohammad-
abad Paskouh) in which the intervention was in the ‘pro-
ject’ format, we see that CBO activities have decreased
considerably over time after the outsiders’ exit. This
shortcoming was addressed in the case of Golbaf by del-
egating the process ownership to skillful resident leaders
while the outsiders actively explored for local talented
individuals and engaged them to take responsibility for the
process leadership.
Taking on the Role of Brokers Who Bridge the Gap
Between the Local Community and Outside
Institutions (and Sometimes Build Appropriate
Institutions)
The outsiders practiced different activities under this role,
such as mobilizing external resources, advocating for
rights, making meta-regional coalitions, bureaucratic
facilitating, and elaborating and providing access to
national and international value-chains and market infor-
mation. Our cases show that in rural Iran this role of
bridging gaps and building institutions is more crucial than
the others because changing institutional voids create a
need for greater levels of effort, resources, and power than
a local community alone can mobilize from within itself.
Nevertheless, this bridging/building role is less emphasized
in CBD literature and practices, in which development
solutions are sought mostly just in the arenas of local
participation and community agency.
Our cases show that it can even be necessary for out-
siders to retain this role for years. In all of our cases, some
forms of relationship—formal or informal—are still pre-
sent between the community and the practitioners. How-
ever, only in Golbaf does the outsider declare this as part of
its intervention strategy—and in Lazour, Basfar, and
Abolhassani, the outside practitioners continue helping the
communities informally to improve their relationships with
public and international organizations.
Although it makes sense in the short term, in order to
make development sustainable, organic relationships (ac-
cess to value-chains, local government, finance, etc.) have
to be established between the community and outside
actors over time. In Basfar and Abolhassani, the outsiders
took steps to legalize the CBO and empower the commu-
nity politically to advocate for its own rights. The outsiders
asserted that they had never spent their own money on the
project, but had simply made the communities aware of
public and international grants and loans and helped them
in receiving them. In Basfar, this resulted in robust con-
nections with the local government—so much so that the
youth of the CBO are now even collaborating in regional
governance. On the other hand, in Lazour and Moham-
madabad Paskouh, the community members whom we
interviewed regretted the fact that they had not taken the
opportunity to mobilize more external support before the
ending of the project. As a result, the CBOs that were
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known as the decision-makers on how to assign the out-
siders’ budget are now losing their existential role. This
once again demonstrates the challenges facing the ‘project’
mode of development. Even in Golbaf, despite the fact that
the relationship is retained as part of its explicit model and
the financial element is sustained by the idea of social
enterprise, a significant burden is placed on the outsiders’
platforms, overloading the outsiders and causing depen-
dencies and bureaucratic inefficiencies.
Conclusion
In this article, we have studied five different cases which
illustrate the recent wave of community-based develop-
ment in Iran. The initial review of the literature revealed
three main types of role fulfilled by outsiders to support the
indigenous processes run by a community: preparing the
ground and increasing readiness, the creation and/or rein-
forcement of CBOs, and making useful linkages between
the CBOs and outside actors. Our analysis corroborates
these three roles by identifying the main root development
issues that can be addressed by outsider interventions: lack
of self-confidence and hopelessness, lack of a minimum
stock of capital to start the process, degraded institutions of
cooperation, and lack of access to outside institutions.
Some typologies have already been proposed for
development and outsider practices in general (Eyben
et al., 2008; Fifka et al., 2016), but this study shows that
different intervention strategies are also possible under the
CBD approach. Therefore, despite the three so-called
similar roles indicating the community-based nature of
interventions, noticeably different strategies and activities
under each role were also explored among the case studies.
In Fig. 2, these similarities and differences are shown.
The history of development practices in the region, the
existing level of local knowledge and functioning social
structures, the presence of de facto leaders in development
processes, and the level of organic access to outside
institutions are some of the determining contextual factors
that correspond with specific intervention strategies under
CBD. The differences in the context tell us whether we
would be better off making primary communication with
public or with community leaders, training in technical
skills or utilizing local knowledge, creating new structures
or seizing traditional ones, exploring new talents or
engaging existing leaders, and deciding when to exit or to
continue relationships with the local community. These
different strategies show that the concept of community-
based development approaches is not as simple or uniform
in successful practice as it is described in some theoretical
texts (Bhattacharyya, 2004; Frank & Smith, 1999; Mathie
& Cunningham, 2003; McLeroy et al., 2003; Murphy,
2014). Recognizing this variation broadens our under-
standing of CBD practices and helps practitioners think
about alternative perspectives and approaches in order to
make better decisions according to the local context.
One implication of this study for policy-makers and
development practitioners is that they first have to under-
stand and recognize the existing local systems and
knowledge. If such considerable capitals are still func-
tioning in the community, we move away from technical
training and building new (democratic) structures and start
the development program by building on the current cap-
itals and improving them. Also, it is important to make
connections with community leaders and give them roles in
the CBD program. In cases where we do not reach the
existing leaders, we first need to explore leadership talent
in public communications and prepare that leadership to
take on responsibility. We also learned that developing
outside relationships is no less important than internal
development in terms of community agency and partici-
pation. This is what ‘project’-like practices—in which the
outsiders plan to build the CBO and supply financials and
training, and then exit in a specific time span—often fail to
take into account. Our results show that the decision to stay
or exit is, again, context-based and depends on the level of
established connections with political bureaucracies and
business value-chains, and it may not result in leaving—
even for many years. However, this does not negate the
crucial task of outsiders to establish organic external
connections.
Yet, we believe that this study is only the first step
toward recognizing the diversity among CBD interven-
tions. We suggest that future research be undertaken to test
and evaluate the proposed intervention strategies in
response to contextual factors. Furthermore, it would be
useful to look at different intervention strategies from the
grassroots perspective, i.e., to extend the study of these
cases in order to bring out to a greater degree local people’s
own perceptions and interpretations about the participatory
nature and developmental impact of such interventions.
Moreover, given the importance of the central government
in Iran, more research should be done on the role of the
national administration and its relations with intervention
organizations and CBOs.
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Fifka, M. S., Kühn, A. L., Adaui, C. R. L., & Stiglbauer, M. (2016).
Promoting development in weak institutional environments: The
understanding and transmission of sustainability by NGOs in
Latin America. Voluntas International Journal of Voluntary and
Nonprofit Organizations, 27(3), 1091–1122.
Firouzabadi, A., & Jafari, M. (2016). The study of indigenous and
religion-based NGOs’ capabilities to resolve the forthcoming
challenges of the development of rural, community-based areas
(Case Study: Ebad Theologue Jihadi Group). Journal of Islamic
Iranian Pattern of Progress Model, 4(1), 153–173. (In Persian).
Frank, F., & Smith, A. (1999). The community development handbook.
Human Resources Development Canada.
Gandy, K., King, K., Streeter Hurle, P., Bustin, C., & Glazebrook, K.
(2016). Poverty and decision-making: How behavioural science
can improve opportunity in the UK, The Behavioural Insights
Team (BIT).
Harriss, J. (2002). Depoliticizing Development: The World Bank and
Social Capital. Anthem Press.
Hesamian, F., Etemad, G., and Haeri, M. (2005). Urbanization in Iran,
Agah, Tehran. (In Persian)
Iran Planning and Budget Organization (2017). An analysis on
National Population and Housing Census in 2016, Tehran. (In
Persian)
Israel, B. A., Schulz, A. J., Parker, E. A., & Becker, A. B. (1998).
Review of community-based research: Assessing partnership
approaches to improve public health. Annual Review of Public
Health, 19(1), 173–202.
Jalili Kamju, S., & Nademi, Y. (2019). Evaluation of the relationship
between underground water resources extraction and rural
poverty in Iran. Journal of Economic Research, 54(3), 525–
550. (In Persian).
Johnson, S. (2011). Where good ideas come from: The natural history
of innovation (1st Riverhead trade (pbk). Riverhead Books.
Jütting, J. (2003). Institutions and development: A critical review.
OECD Development Centre Working Paper No. 210, OECD
Publishing, Paris.
Kamali, B. (2007). Critical reflections on participatory action research
for rural development in Iran. Action Research, 5(2), 103–122.
Katouzian, M. A. (1974). Land reform in Iran a case study in the
political economy of social engineering. Journal of Peasant
Studies, 1(2), 220–239.
Kilpatrick, S., Field, J., & Falk, I. (2003). Social capital: An analytical
tool for exploring lifelong learning and community development.
British Educational Research Journal, 29(3), 417–433.
Kolahi, M., Moriya, K., Sakai, T., Khosrojerdi, E., & Etemad, V.
(2014). Introduction of participatory conservation in Iran: Case
study of the rural communities’ perspectives in Khojir National
Voluntas
123
Park. International Journal of Environmental Research, 8(4),
913–930.
Long, N., & Long, A. (Eds.). (1992). Battlefields of knowledge: the
interlocking of theory and practice in social research and
development. Routledge.
Majd, M. G. (1987). Land reform policies in Iran. American Journal
of Agricultural Economics, 69(4), 843–848.
Mansuri, G., & Rao, V. (2004). Community-based and-driven
development: A critical review. World Bank Research Observer,
19(1), 1–39.
Mansuri, G., & Rao, V. (2013). Localizing development: Does
participation work? World Bank.
Mathie, A., & Cunningham, G. (2003). From clients to citizens:
Asset-based community development as a strategy for commu-
nity-driven development. Development in Practice, 13(5), 474–
486.
McLeroy, K. R., Norton, B. L., Kegler, M. C., Burdine, J. N., &
Sumaya, C. V. (2003). Community-based interventions. Amer-
ican Journal of Public Health, 93(4), 529–533.
Merzel, C., & D’Afflitti, J. (2003). Reconsidering community-based
health promotion: Promise, performance, and potential. Ameri-
can Journal of Public Health, 93(4), 557–574.
Mosse, D. (2005). Cultivating development: An ethnography of aid
policy and practice (anthropology, culture, and society). Pluto
Press.
Mosse, D., & Lewis, D. (2006). Theoretical approaches to brokerage
and translation in development. In D. Mosse & D. Lewis (Eds.),
Development brokers and translators: The ethnography of aid
and agencies (pp. 1–26). Kumarian Press Inc, West Hartford.
Mullainathan, S., & Shafir, E. (2013). Scarcity: Why having too little
means so much, time books. Henry Holt & Company LLC.
Murphy, J. W. (2014). Community-based interventions: Philosophy
and action. Springer Science & Business Media.
Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. Y. (1993). Making
democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton
University Press.
Rafipoor, F. (1997). Modernization and conflict: An attempt toward
the analysis. Sahami Enteshar. (In Persian).
Rafipoor, F. (2014). Darigh Ast Iran ke Viran Shavad, Sahami
Enteshar, Tehran. (In Persian).
Rezvani, M. R., Badri, A., Salmani, M., & Qarani Arani, B. (2009).
Analyzing Effective factors on participatory rural development
model (case study: Hableh River Catchment Area). Human
Geography Research Quarterly, 42(4), 67–86. (In Persian).
Rosato, M. (2015). A framework and methodology for differentiating
community intervention forms in global health. Community
Development Journal, 50(2), 244–263.
Sabetian, F. (2015). Community governance and Livelihood assess-
ment report for Abolhassani Tribal Confederacy, Centre for
Sustainable Development and Environment (Cenesta), Tehran.
Toomey, A. H. (2009). Empowerment and disempowerment in
community development practice: Eight roles practitioners play.
Community Development Journal, 46(2), 181–195.
Watkins, M., & Shulman, H. (2008). Toward psychologies of
liberation. Palgrave Macmillan.
Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Voluntas
123
